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S/P - Mr. Butler

August 18, 1950

ARA - Mr. Halle

Planning Inter-American Action in Case of War

We should appreciate S/P's advice on the attached project for planning now to meet, on the inter-American scene, the contingencies of U.S. involvement in war overseas.

I hope we may move forward to organize the project before the end of next week.

Louis J. Halle, Jr.

cc: EUR - Mr. Achilles
NEA - Mr. Howard
FE - Mr. Emmerson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
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ARA PLANNING

COOPERATION OF AMERICAN REPUBLICS IN CASE OF WAR

This paper sets forth a project for planning the action to be taken by the U.S. on the inter-American scene in case of war.

ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS:

1. Total war comes abruptly as a result of military assault by the USSR.
2. The U.S. becomes increasingly involved in limited wars to repel aggression by Soviet puppets.

PRINCIPLES:

1. Our national defense is inseparable from the defense of the Hemisphere.
2. The defense of every other American state is inseparable from the defense of the Hemisphere.
3. All American states are obliged, by the logic of 1 and 2 and by formal commitments, to cooperate in meeting an assault on any one of them by the USSR.

   (a) We would expect them to be actively on our side in any all-out war against the USSR.

   (b) We would expect them to be only less actively on our side in a commitment of our

our forces to a limited war.

4. Inter-American cooperation in a total war, or in a limited war that called for organized inter-American effort, would be developed in its basic phases through the machinery of the OAS.
5. The U.S. would have the responsibility of leadership in developing this cooperation.
6. The possible contributions of the other American states include every element that enters into the waging of war: economic, political, diplomatic, psychological, military, and police.
7. The U.S. has a responsibility toward the other American states arising out of their dependence on us, especially in time of war.

PROBLEM:

If the U.S. should be plunged into war with the USSR, it would immediately confront the necessity of exercising leadership in organizing inter-American cooperation. It would be called upon to make certain basic decisions on short notice. Those decisions are more likely to be sound to the extent that they have been anticipated and agreement on them reached within our Government.

Any involvement of the U.S. in a limited war would likewise, in its degree, test U.S. preparedness for exercising prompt leadership in the Hemisphere.

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The problem falls into three parts:

1. To determine what contributions we would want from the other American states, individually and collectively;
2. To determine what we would be called upon to do for them so that they could support their respective parts in the common effort;
3. To determine how we would want to go about achieving the cooperation envisaged in 1 and 2.

1. CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER AMERICAN STATES

(a) Political-diplomatic contributions, i.e.: declarations of war; severance of diplomatic relations with the enemy; severance of communications with the enemy; accordance of belligerent status; diplomatic pressure on neutrals; etc.

(b) Military contributions, i.e.: anti-submarine patrols, provision of convoy escorts, and other forms of naval and air cooperation; provision of military and air bases; granting of right of transit for military personnel and supplies; military manpower in the form of organized units or individuals; etc.

(c) Police contributions, i.e.: protection of port and other strategic installations; round-up of subversives and suspects; surveillance of persons and communications; border and customs precautions;

collection

collection and exchange of intelligence information; etc.

(d) Economic contributions, i.e.: severance of commercial relations with enemy; economic boycotting, including "proclaimed list", and other trade controls; rationing and price controls; other financial controls; production and supply of raw materials; etc.

(e) Psychological contributions, i.e.: cooperation in propaganda and conduct of psychological warfare through active participation; through the making available of facilities; etc.

The list of contributions, as above, might be divided into (a) measures for immediate action in the first few days, such as severance of diplomatic relations, and (b) measures that will take time to develop, such as the production and supply of raw materials.

2. U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO OTHER AMERICAN STATES

(a) Assistance in sustaining civilian economies, i.e.: allocation and price-controls of essential U.S. materials in short supply; assistance in local production; assistance in establishing local price-control and rationing systems; assistance in other anti-inflationary measures; maintenance of shipping, air service, and other means of transport; etc.

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(b) Assistance in maintaining internal security, i.e.: training and equipping of personnel for protection of strategic installations, surveillance of suspects, etc.; assistance in rounding-up and interning or expelling dangerous persons; assistance in organization of police; etc.

(c) Assistance in developing military forces, i.e.: training, equipment, and indoctrination of armed forces; development of strategic plans, etc.

(d) Assistance in settling intra-Hemisphere disputes: Example: one of the urgent pieces of business the American states confronted at Rio in January 1942 was settlement of the boundary dispute between Peru and Ecuador. The Americas must not be internally divided if they are to cooperate effectively in meeting the contingencies envisaged.

3. MEANS FOR DEVELOPING INTER-AMERICAN COOPERATION

Consideration of these means must be in terms of the lists of contributions desired by us and required of us. For example, the means to attain prompt agreement on, say, the severance of diplomatic relations might be a Meeting of Foreign Ministers, as in 1942. Among the means to obtain production and supply of raw materials might be (a) general resolutions of appropriate inter-

American

American bodies (to be specified), (b) bilateral agreements in implementation of such resolutions, and (c) programs of U.S. technical assistance to overcome obstacles to production. (Our contributions to the other American states will often be means for eliciting their contributions to us.) Military and police objectives might be approached through action by the COAS, the Military Advisory Committee, or the Inter-American Defense Board. The means to be used are not mutually exclusive and several will usually have to be coordinated for the attainment of any particular objective.

In planning the use of our regional machinery in the OAS, there must be concurrent consideration of its relationship to world-wide international machinery, either that of the UN or ad hoc boards and commissions of various sorts.

DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY WITHIN ARA:

Responsibility for initial preparation of plans projected above is assigned as follows:

1. Contributions from other American states:

Political-diplomatic -- AR-Mr. Dreier

Military -- AR-Mr. Dreier

Police -- ARA-Mr. Spalding

Economic -- ARA/E-Mr. White

Psychological -- ARA/P-Mr. Rankin

2. Contributions to other American states:

Civilian economies -- ARA/E-Mr. White

Internal security -- ARA-Mr. Spalding

Military forces -- AR-Mr. Dreier

Hemisphere disputes -- AR-Mr. Dreier

3. Means for developing cooperation:

Responsibility for defining the means in terms of the respective objectives is assigned as set forth in 1 and 2 above. That is, the officers responsible for listing contributions in the respective fields shall also recommend the means by which provision for such contributions should be made. Such officers should consult with AR-Mr. Dreier on matters involving inter-American and general international organizational machinery. They should consult with ARA/E-Mr. White on matters involving technical assistance.

PROCEDURES:

The plans prepared under each of the assignments made above should be addressed primarily to the first assumption (total war) and secondarily to the second (limited war). This is not based on the relative likelihood of the two possibilities, in many cases, however, the

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the second assumption will involve only a modified application of plans prepared with a view to the first.

The plans should provide alternatives where alternative contingencies are contemplated.

It will, of course, be necessary for the several officers informally to consult other U.S. agencies where such agencies have primary responsibility. Thus military plans require consultation with the Defense Department. (The assumption of such initiative by the Department of State should have a stimulating effect on these other agencies.) The several officers will also have to consult outside of ARA in the Department.

It will be necessary to coordinate the several features of the present project with other projects that have been or are being undertaken along similar lines--such as the project of the Study Group for Wartime International Cooperation (SGEC).

It will be advisable to draw on experience in 1941-45, not only of the Department but also of FEA, CIAA, etc. DRA should be invited to help here.

The draft plans should contain conclusions or recommendations plus the essential supporting arguments.

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It may not be possible to avoid giving Top Secret classification to some of these draft plans.

During the initial stages in which the several responsible officers are developing their recommendations, Mr. Halle will try to keep himself informed of their thinking with a view to assisting in the resolution, at an early stage, of any inconsistencies among their several approaches. He will be responsible for coordinating their respective drafts and bringing them together in convenient form for consideration by the ARA staff and S/P. He will also be responsible for bringing the pertinent thinking of the Policy Planning Staff to bear on the thinking in ARA.

OBJECTIVE:

The objective will be to have at least "roughed-up" plans for action on the inter-American scene upon the outbreak of (a) total war, or (b) limited war. Thus, for example, should another Pearl Harbor confront us, we could in a few hours begin action, on predetermined lines, to organize the Hemisphere. If a Meeting of Foreign Ministers or other conference was to be called, we could cut down the period of preparation to the extent that we had already decided what action we might wish it to take. Above all, we would already have reached some meeting of minds on